How safe is the safety paradigm? by Arah, O.A. (Onyebuchi) & Klazinga, N.S. (Niek)
doi:10.1136/qshc.2003.007070 
 2004;13;226-232 Qual. Saf. Health Care
  
O A Arah and N S Klazinga 
  
 How safe is the safety paradigm?
 http://qhc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/13/3/226
Updated information and services can be found at: 
 These include:
 References
 http://qhc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/13/3/226#otherarticles
1 online articles that cite this article can be accessed at: 
  
 http://qhc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/13/3/226#BIBL
This article cites 36 articles, 20 of which can be accessed free at: 
Rapid responses
 http://qhc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/eletter-submit/13/3/226
You can respond to this article at: 
 service
Email alerting
top right corner of the article 
Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article - sign up in the box at the
Topic collections
 (591 articles) Medical error / patient safety 
 (51 articles) Indicators and performance management 
  
Articles on similar topics can be found in the following collections 
 Notes   
 http://www.bmjjournals.com/cgi/reprintform
To order reprints of this article go to: 
 http://www.bmjjournals.com/subscriptions/
 go to: Quality and Safety in Health CareTo subscribe to 
 on 1 November 2006 qhc.bmjjournals.comDownloaded from 
WORLD VIEW
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This paper reviews safety initiatives in the health systems of
the UK, Canada, Australia, and the US. Initiatives to tackle
safety shortcomings involve public-private collaborations.
Patient safety agencies (to institute learning, action and
safety culture), adverse event reporting and, to a lesser
extent, safety related performance indicators are currently
used to design safer health systems. Their benefits are
mixed, but there is little debate as to their possible side
effects. Foreseeable adverse effects of multiple safety
organisations stem from them being too many, too vague,
too narrowly focused, threatened by the medical practice
environment, and too optimistic. Safety related
performance indicators are most developed in the US but
suffer from inadequacies of administrative data,
underreporting, variable indicator definitions, ‘‘extended’’
use, and low sensitivity of the diagnosis coding system, and
arguable preventability of the prescribed conditions. A
critical appraisal of the implications of these deficiencies is
important to assure the safety of current health system
safety initiatives and to establish evidence based safety. It is
necessary to embed health system safety (as well as patient
safety) in the societal culture, structures, and policies which
promote effective, user centred, high performance care
while allowing for healthy innovation.
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H
ealth system safety matters because lapses
in safety harm patients, their families and,
ultimately, society. Media coverage of
many cases of serious injury or death as the
result of unsafe health care has heightened pub-
lic concern about health care safety. In response,
policymakers have, in many countries, issued
reports or set up agencies to try to tackle a pro-
blem that is clearly longstanding and endemic.
However, like the wider agenda of healthcare
quality,1 patient safety has only recently become
a priority on the policy agenda. This recent atten-
tion focuses on the risks of harm from health
care (for instance, dangerous drug overdose), the
risks in the care environment (for all patients
and providers), the flawed system designs which
enable injury occurrence,2–6 and better patient
involvement in harm management.7
Following these considerable public, profes-
sional, and political interests in patient safety,
several industrialized countries—for example,
UK,8 9 Canada,10 11 Australia,12 13 Denmark,14 15
and USA5—have now established safety initia-
tives. Notably, these interests have resulted in
large public-private collaborations, safety orga-
nizations, adverse event reporting systems,16
research into errors and adverse events,17 18 and
calls for system redesign.5 19 20 Also, patient safety
has become a core dimension of performance
measurement and management frameworks.
However, these safety initiatives raise several
questions. What are the key components of the
efforts and what are they actually aimed at? Can
other countries really adopt similar initiatives? If
so, are they sufficiently safe and sound for cross-
national learning? Will such initiatives solve the
problems of health system safety? Although
safety is the topic of a growing number of scien-
tific papers, few articles have tried to critique the
actual reactions to safety in health care.
In this paper we briefly examine the national
agenda on and measurement of patient safety in
four advanced health systems—namely, the UK,
Canada, Australia, and the USA—and reflect on
the potential shortcomings of these efforts.
Although it is not our intention to give an
exhaustive overview of national safety efforts in
these four countries, we want to start a reflective
discussion on their nature, direction, and poten-
tial shortcomings.
Our approach consisted of (1) exploring the
relevant literature, documents, and websites on
safety in the UK, Canada, Australia, and the
USA; (2) seeking information from the revealed
safety agencies to summarize their goals and
current safety activities; (3) reviewing their
national health system performance frameworks
and indicators; and (4) where possible, searching
the scientific literature for supporting evidence
for safety related performance indicators seen in
national indicator frameworks. We then reflected
on all findings (summarized in the accompany-
ing tables) from a systems perspective. This
exploratory policy analysis entailed reviewing
the key issues on the safety agenda and
examining the ‘‘whats’’ and ‘‘whys’’ of these
issues. The key findings are presented in two
sections on (1) national patient safety agencies
and reporting systems and (2) safety related
performance indicators.
NATIONAL PATIENT SAFETY AGENCIES
AND REPORTING SYSTEMS
Table 1 gives an overview of the national patient
safety agencies found in the four countries.
UK
The British take quality and safety in the NHS
quite seriously.8 9 21–26 The Bristol case27 28 and
other high profile affairs29–31 probably served to
place the safety debate in the public domain.
Following these events and two major safety
publications,8 9 the government set up the
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National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA).25 26 The NPSA
collates, analyzes, and feeds back information on lapses in
patient safety within the NHS, and works with NHS staff and
organizations to promote a fair and open culture (table 2).25 It
also recently introduced a national reporting and learning
system across the NHS to complement local level vital
reporting, learning and action. Some examples of other
stakeholders who are nationally or locally involved in patient
safety across the UK are shown in the footnotes to table 1.
Canada
Health Canada, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research
(CIHR), and the Canadian Institute for Health Information
(CIHI) are sponsoring the investigation of the national
hospital adverse events and errors to be published in late
2004.10 11 32 Also, Health Canada is currently funding an
exploration of the possibility of a national incident reporting
system. The public-private roundtable on patient safety
organized by the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons
in September 2001 led to the formation of the National
Steering Committee on Patient Safety (NSCPS) which has
made 19 recommendations for a national integrated strategy
along five themes (see table 2).33 These recommendations are
similar to those made by Baker and Norton in their
systematic review and report to Health Canada.34 In
February 2003 the Canadian Federal Budget earmarked $50
Table 1 Overview of national patient safety agencies
UK* Canada Australia USA`
Leading patient
safety
organization(s)
National Patient Safety
Agency*
Health Canada (HC); Canadian
Institute for Health Information
(CIHI) and the Canadian Institutes
of Health Research (CIHR);
National Steering Committee on
Patient Safety (NSCPS)
Australian Council for Safety
and Quality in Health Care
(ACSQHC); Australian Patient
Safety Foundation (APSF)
Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ); National
Patient Safety Foundation
(NPSF); Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO)
Nature Special health authority set
up by the UK government
(Statutory Instrument 2001
No. 1743)
HC: Federal Ministry of Health,
Canada;
CIHI: independent, not-for-profit
body for quality health information;
CIHR: premier federal agency for
health research;
NSCPS: an organ of the Royal
College of Physicians and Surgeons
ACSQHC: national council set
up by the Australian Federal
Health Ministers; APSF:
non-profit independent
organization dedicated to the
advancement of patient safety
AHRQ: nationally authorized
agency for quality and safety
research;
NPSF: not-for-profit, multi-
disciplinary body;
JCAHO: independent, not-for-
profit, standards setting and
accrediting body in health care
Web address www.npsa.nhs.uk www.hc-sc.gc.ca www.safetyandquality.org www.ahrq.org
www.cihi.ca www.apsf.net.au www.npsf.org
www.cihr.cahttp://rcpsc.
medical.org
www.jcaho.org
Year national
safety program
started
July 2001 May 2002 (CIHI/CIHR hospital
safety study funding)
2000 (ACSQHC); 2000 (AHRQ);
1989 (APSF) 1998 (NPSF);
19961; 2002** (JCAHO)
Mission To coordinate efforts to learn
from adverse events and
‘near misses’ in the NHS; to
promote openness and
fairness, lead reporting and
feedback; to monitor progress;
to promote an open and fair
culture in the NHS
HC: To coordinate national safety
agenda;
CIHI/CIHR: To examine the extent
of adverse events in Canadian
acute care hospitals and
availability of data for continuous
monitoring and reduction of events;
RCPS NSCPS: To develop
framework and plan for Canadian
patient safety efforts
ACSQHC: To lead a national
and collaborative approach to
improve safety and quality of
patient care; to develop a
national framework, put the
consumer first and promote
research;
APSF: To eliminate
preventable harm in health
care
AHRQ: To support research
designed to improve the
outcomes and quality of health
care, reduce its costs, address
patient safety and medical
errors;
NPSF: To improve patient safety
knowledge and awareness
JCAHO: To ensure a greater
focus on priority safe practices
Operational
mechanism
Establishing and operating a
new, mandatory national
reporting system for adverse
events and ‘‘‘near misses’’;
provision of national
leadership and guidance
CIHI/CIHR: Reviewing randomly
selected patient hospital records
by specially-trained physicians
and nurses who belong to the
research team
ACSQHC: Using annual action
plans to achieve its priority
areas; committing to a
National Patient Safety
Research Centre, a National
Centre for Patient Safety
Improvement, system capacity
building, accreditation and
standard setting mechanisms;
AHRQ: Developing error-
reduction technologies;
conducting safety demonstration
projects and error reporting
strategies; supporting safety
research
NPSF: Identifying and applying
safety pathways; raising public
awareness;
JCAHO: Rolling safety goals for
accreditation; reporting and
analysis of sentinel events
APSF: Using its Australian
Incident Monitoring System
Remarkable
public event(s)
on patient
safety
Shipman and Ledward
affairs;29 30 high profile
intrathecal vincristine
deaths,31 etc; Bristol case
1996 (2001 inquiry report);27 28
An Organization with a
Memory, Building a Safer
NHS for Patients8 9
Lack of prior nationally
coordinated safety initiative;
error incidence unknown10 11
Incident monitoring in
anesthesia (1987/88);43 the
Quality in Australian Health
Care Study (1995)38
Harvard Medical Practice
studies (1991/1995);36 37
NPSF’s Annenberg conferences
(1996, 1998, 2001, 2002);51
IOM’s report: ‘To Err is Human’
(1999/2000)5
*Other UK safety stakeholders include National Clinical Assessment Authority, NHS Litigation Authority, Commission for Health Improvement, Coroner, Health
Authority, Medical Devices Agency, Health and Safety Agency, Medicines Control Agency, and Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT).
Other initiatives are from the Canadian Council on Health Services Accreditation (CCHSA), Canadian Society of Hospital Pharmacists (CSHP), the Institute for
Safe Medication Practices (ISMP Canada), Canadian Coalition on Medical Incident Reporting and Prevention (CCMIRP), Canadian Healthcare Association (CHA),
Canadian Nurses Association (CNA), and provincial/territorial patient safety initiatives.
`Other national agencies in the US include the US Pharmacopoeia (USP), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP),
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the National Forum for Health Care Quality Measurement
and Reporting (NQF), the Quality Interagency Coordination Task Force (QuIC), the Leapfrog Group for Patient Safety.
1JCAHO’s sentinel event policy.
**For JCAHO’s national patient safety goals.
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million over 5 years for the creation of a Canadian Patient
Safety Agency. The Institute for Safe Medication Practices
(ISMP Canada) is an independent not-for-profit body that
promotes safe medication practices, collects and analyzes
medication errors, and recommends improvements.35
Australia
The Commonwealth Department of Health funded, in 1994,
the Quality in Australian Health Care Study (QAHCS) to
detail the degree of adverse events in Australian hospitals.
Modeled on the Harvard Medical Practice Study in the US,36 37
the QAHCS38 in June 1995 showed that 16.6% of admissions
had adverse events of which 51% could be preventable.38 This
publication attracted much attention, immediately resulting
in the National Taskforce on Quality in Australian Health
Care which recommended increased funding and establish-
ment of a national organization for safety and quality of
care. The subsequent formation in October 1996 of a National
Expert Advisory Group on Safety and Quality in Australian
Healthcare led to the establishment of the Australian
Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQHC) in
2000.12 It coordinates the national safety action and has so
far made four reports to the Health Ministers.39–42 Other
national safety efforts include the Australian Patient Safety
Foundation (APSF) which developed the Australian Incident
Monitoring System13 43 44 and a classification system for
coding and reporting.45 The Australian initiatives served as
the template upon which the US and UK built similar safety
agencies.
USA
The Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) report ‘‘To Err is Human’’5
is probably the most strategic publication on patient safety in
the US. This report put deaths from medical error in the US at
about 44 000–98 000 per annum, with 7000 of these resulting
from medication errors alone. Established within 3 months
of the IOM report, the Quality Interagency Coordination Task
Force (QuIC) recommended some 100 actions to improve
safety.46 The Agency for Health Care Research and Quality
(AHRQ) oversees the federal government’s interests in
safety47 (tables 1 and 2). AHRQ sponsored the Stanford
University Evidenced Practice Center and the University of
California to produce a critical appraisal of evidence on safety
practices48 and the AHRQ patient safety indicators (as part of
the three-part AHRQ Quality Indicators project).49 The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO), as an independent accrediting organization, has
patient safety requirements for hospitals which it accredits.50
The National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF) aims to lead
the transition from a culture of blame to that of safety.51
MedMARX is a medication error reporting program of the US
Pharmacopoeia to share experiences and best quality
practices.52 Other notable national or widespread initiatives
are from the Institute for Safe Medication Practice53 (ISMP, a
Table 2 Current objectives and activities of national safety agencies in four developed countries
UK25 Canada32–34 Australia39–42 13 USA47 50 51
National Patient Safety Agency Recommendations of the National Steering
Committee on Patient Safety
Australian Council on Safety and
Quality in Health Care
Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality
l National reporting and
learning system
(NRLS, launched 2004)
l Developing patient reporting
l Root cause analysis of
incidents
l Promote open and fair
NHS culture for disclosure
and learning
l Active system support for
staff
l Establishing national
patient safety priorities
l Researching and developing
national safety solutions
l Partnering with NHS
organizations to ensure
reporting, learning and
action
l In summary, ensuring that
the NHS has ‘‘memory’’
and is safer
l Establishing a Canadian Patient
Safety Institute (CPSI)
l Legal and regulatory processes
l Measurement and evaluation
l Continuing education and
professional development processes
l Improving information and
communication processes
l Priority action areas
l Supporting healthcare system
workers for safer patient care
l Improving data and information
l Involving healthcare consumers
l Redesigning systems of healthcare
to facilitate a culture of safety
l Building awareness and
understanding of safety
l Active safety research support and
knowledge generation on safety
practices and control
l Error reporting and analysis
l Effective technology for safety
l Training and education of students
and professionals on systemic nat-
ure of errors
l Development of quality indicators
e.g. patient safety indicators
l Building partnerships locally,
nationally and internationally
l Consumer support and education
Recommendations of the Baker and Norton
report
l Better national and provincial
reporting systems; systems
implementation
l Building awareness and setting
priorities
l Skills and knowledge development
l Supporting safety efforts at
organizational and policy levels
Australian Patient Safety Foundation
l Incident reporting and incident
monitoring aggregated from
system-wide health units
l Coordinating the Australian
Incident Monitoring System
l Maintaining the Generic
Occurrence ClassificationTM
for coding and reporting
incidents and adverse events
National Patient Safety Foundation
l Identifying and creating a core
body of knowledge
l Identifying pathways to apply
the knowledge
l Developing and enhancing the
culture of receptivity to patient
safety
l Raising public awareness and
foster communications about
patient safety
Health Canada
l Providing national leadership, and
coordination of territorial/
provincial patient safety initiatives
l Implementing the national quality
and safety agenda
l Commissioning safety research
l Developing the Canadian
Medication Incident Reporting
and Prevention System (CMIRPS)
Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations
l Reducing sentinel events
l Achieving shift in health care
culture for proactive risk reduction
l Improving public confidence in the
US health care system
l Supporting activities to achieve
core goals, (e.g. standards and
safe practices development,
consumer campaigns, patient
safety
publications, education)
With useful input from communication with persons representing these organizations as listed in the acknowledgements.
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not-for-profit agency that educates professionals or institu-
tions on adverse events and runs a national Medication
Errors Reporting Program with the US Pharmacopoeia), the
Food and Drug Administration (with its voluntary
MedWatch reporting system),54 the voluntary National
Nosocomial Infection Survey of the Centers for the Disease
Control and Prevention,55 and the National Quality
Forum.56 57
SAFETY RELATED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
The development and the use of indicators within conceptual
frameworks are major ways through which national govern-
ments drive performance improvement in their health
systems.58 59 The Canadian60 and Australian61 health system
performance frameworks have one indicator each for patient
safety—admission to hospital for hip fracture and hospital
separations with an adverse event, respectively. Table 3
summarizes these two indicators. However, the ACSQHC also
has sentinel events indicators which were approved by the
Australian Health Ministers and which represent binomial
catastrophic events of system failure deemed suitable for
national aggregation. The US (AHRQ) probably has the most
comprehensive set of indicators on patient safety.49 The
AHRQ patient safety indicators (PSIs) represent a major
undertaking to screen, at provider or system level, patient
safety issues using hospital administrative data. These
indicators—with empirical averages ranging from four
transfusion reactions per million discharges at risk to
244.08 obstetric traumas in 1000 vaginal deliveries with
instrumentation—cover surgical, obstetric and medical con-
ditions, risk adjusted for age, sex, diagnosis related group,
and comorbidity categories49 (see table 4 for an overview).
The Canadian Institute for Health Information has also
adopted the AHRQ safety indicators. Other indicator systems
in the USA include the JCAHO Indicator Measurement
System for infection control and the JCAHO sentinel events.
DISCUSSION
This paper has explored briefly the national safety initiatives
in four advanced health systems. The use of patient safety
agencies, incident reporting and learning systems, and
indicators to address patient safety concerns is emerging.
There are far more initiatives in use than can be highlighted
in this paper, but this review gives a snapshot of the national
level safety agenda. The benefits of such programmatic
efforts are assumed, so we will not discuss them here. The
focus here is on their disadvantages. In rushing to do
something about errors in medicine, countries must concur-
rently critique what they are doing—given the wide range of
ideas and tools being deployed—and the potential for these
to become part of accountability mechanisms. Surely
societies cannot afford to wait for evidence of failure of
these efforts before addressing them. We first discuss the
Table 4 Patient safety indicators of the US Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality49
Indicator topic
Empirical
average* Drawback
Complications of
anesthesia
0.55 Definition varies; underreporting;
unspecific denominator; unknown
validity
Death in low
mortality DRGs
0.66 Mixed severity; no published
evidence of ‘‘explicit process’’ and
‘‘staffing’’ construct validity
Decubitus ulcer 21.5 Mixed severity; case mix bias;
underreporting; conflicting validity
evidence
Failure to rescue 174.24 May be unpreventable; mixed
severity; perverse influence
Foreign body left
during procedure
0.09 Non-specific denominator; rare;
needs stratification
Iatrogenic
pneumothorax
0.67 Non-specific denominator; unknown
validity
Selected infections
due to medical care
1.99 Perverse influence; underreporting
Postoperative
hemorrhage or
hematoma
2.06 Case mix bias; non-specific
denominator; needs stratification
Postoperative hip
fracture
0.80 Case mix bias; non-specific
denominator
Postoperative
physiological and
metabolic
derangement
0.89 Definition may vary; no published
construct validity evidence
Postoperative
pulmonary embolism
or deep venous
thrombosis
9.19 Needs stratification; may be
underreported
Postoperative
respiratory failure
3.59 Case mix bias; event may be
unavoidable
Postoperative sepsis 10.91 Definition may vary; perverse effects;
unclear construct validity
Postoperative wound
dehiscence
1.93 Case mix bias; unclear construct
validity evidence
Accidental puncture
or laceration
3.29 Underreporting; may be
unpreventable
Transfusion reaction 0.004 Rare; needs stratification; unknown
validity
Birth trauma (injury
to neonate)
6.67 Definition may vary; mixed severity;
unclear construct validity
Obstetric trauma
(Cesarean delivery)
5.93 Case mix bias; may be
unpreventable; unclear construct
validity
Obstetric trauma
(vaginal delivery
with instrument)
244.08 Case mix bias; may be
unpreventable; unclear construct
validity
Obstetric trauma
(vaginal delivery
without instrument )
86.60 Case mix bias; may be
unpreventable; unclear construct
validity
*Per 1000 population at risk; represents the average performance for a
nationwide sample of hospitals. Obtained from AHRQ analysis using the
2000 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) State Inpatient
Database (SID) for 29 states. Risk adjusted for age, sex, diagnosis related
group (DRG), and comorbidity categories.
Table 3 Current Canadian and Australian national
patient safety indicators and their properties
Canada60 Australia61
Indicator
topic
Hip fracture hospitalization Hospital separations
with an adverse event
Numerator Age standardized acute
care hospitalization rate for
fracture of the hip per
100 000 (ICD-9 or ICD-
9-CM diagnosis code of
820.0-820.3, 820.8,
820.9)
Hospital separations*
with an adverse event
by an external cause
group (e.g.
misadventures,
complications and
adverse drug events
Denominator Population aged 65
and older
Total annual hospital
separations
Source of
data
Canadian Institute for
Health Information; Hospital
Morbidity Database
National Hospital
Morbidity Database
(NHMD)
Target and
system level
Safety issues in long term
care facilities; hospitals
and health system
Safety in medication;
surgical and medical
care; hospitals
Drawback May represent readmissions
or case transfers; may
overestimate incidence of
hip fractures; hip fractures
can occur independent of
system safety
Data may contain
mislabeled cases
(e.g. poisonings) not
related to adverse
events
Latest
empirical
average
575 per 100 000 (95%
CI: 568–582 per 100 000
for year 2000–2001)
264 347`
*’’Separation’’ refers to an episode of care such as a total hospital stay
(from admission to transfer, discharge, or death) or part of a hospital stay
involving care change (e.g. from acute to rehabilitation).
1999–2000.
`Total number of hospital separations with adverse events in 1997–8
representing 4.8% of total separations.
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safety agencies and reporting systems together, and then the
safety indicators.
It is important to note that the different institutional
approaches to safety are related to the differences in the
structure and control of the various health systems. For
instance, the pluralistic US health system is, as would be
expected, characterized by more safety bodies than is the case
in a more uniform system such as the UK NHS (see table 1).
Safety agencies and adverse event reporting systems
Foreseeable disadvantages of existing safety agencies and
adverse event reporting systems seem to stem from them
being too many, too vague, too narrowly focused, threatened
by the medical practice environment, and too optimistic.
Too many
The safety organizations and reporting systems appear too
many and may impose confusion and excessive regulatory
burden on health actors. This overcrowding of the ‘‘perfor-
mance environment’’58 has been discussed in the case of NHS
regulation.62 Ineffective extraneous regulation and bureau-
cracy slow innovation. Professionals may become risk averse,
innovate less, and potentially decrease overall clinical
effectiveness (because when patients are not treated, they
avoid harm but they also lose out in gaining any benefits).
The practice of medicine, as we know it, is an art and can be a
risky venture for all involved. No two patients are identical—
nor are any two errors. Even in this era of clinical guidelines,
medical intricacies imply that professional providers will be
innovative. Innovation is the backbone of learning and
growth, offering relative advantage over the status quo.63
Too vague
There are many definitions51 and concepts of patient safety
which risk making the core notions vague. The specifications,
nature, and usefulness of tools used for reporting and
learning from incidents are largely dependent on these still
poorly aligned terminology and subjective conceptualizations.
This makes room for unfortunate mix ups and wrong
analysis. There are debates on whether safety should focus
on medical injuries64 or errors.65 Furthermore, safety and
effectiveness as dimensions of performance appear to overlap
when we include errors of omission within safety. For
emphasis and action, errors of omission deserve to be
separated out as safety issues, especially since not doing the
right thing is not only ineffective, but also harmful when the
wrong thing is done instead.
Too narrowly focused
Although this paper examines patient safety initiatives, it is
evident that current efforts focus too narrowly on the patient
with little explicit linkage to wider aspects of health system
safety. Risk management entails reducing harm not just to
patients but also to staff, visitors,3 and the environment
(including the society). Many national safety initiatives try to
address all these, albeit disjointedly. Furthermore, as shown
in tables 3 and 4, staff and environmental safety measures
are not currently captured in performance frameworks.
Obviously, health systems cannot treat these other aspects
as independent concerns.
Threatened by the medical practice environment
The medical practice environment remains prohibitively
litigious. The current safety paradigm does not seem to be
winning against the tort system and apportioning of blame.
Espousing a no-fault rationale in the public domain, while
the blame culture rages, has done little to stem the litigation
tide. Nor has the current approach to ‘‘safety culture’’
(restricted to the health and legal systems) helped. As in
the wider quality movement, voluntary disclosure and partial
openness further undermine these efforts.66–68
Too optimistic
Current thinking on patient safety reflects a zero tolerance of
harm. With abundant referencing to the aviation and other
industries, and from quality management cycles to cognitive
meta-systems,69 research has enabled health systems to adopt
systems engineering and causal analytical rationales and
tools from the non-medical world. Where these allied and
industrial sectors have established safety nets, expected
minimums, and unavoidable maximums, medicine has no
acceptable levels of adverse events and errors, nor should it. A
practical approach so far has been to fight the frequency and
severity of adverse events to the barest levels possible. An
obvious disadvantage is that we become too hopeful in the
short to medium term but disenchanted in the long term
when we get mixed results. In the absence of exhaustive data
on the lapses and of evidence of what works and what does
not, our zero tolerance may remain naively optimistic.
Safety indicators
Even at a national headline level, just reporting on hip
fracture as seen in the Canadian health indicators framework
will not give a balanced view of health care safety (table 3).
The US AHRQ safety indicators are more extensive but suffer
from the shortcomings related to administrative data,
underreporting, indicator definitions, and preventability of
the prescribed conditions (see table 4).70 Their use of hospital
administrative data imports the problems of incomplete
data and inaccurate and variable coding of ICD-9-CM
(International Classification of Diseases, 9th edition, Clinical
Modification) diagnosis fields.71 Also, the ICD-9-CM coding
system was not created with safety issues in mind and is
therefore inadequate for identifying errors and injuries.72
Basing safety tools on administrative data increases the
likelihood of low sensitivity of these indicators in flagging
incidents.73 Although much has been done to increase the
validity and reliability of the AHRQ performance safety
indicators, there is still a long way to go. Combining
anesthetic complications together into one measure is clearly
counterproductive as the total count may stabilize while the
constituent conditions vary tremendously. In addition, the
AHRQ performance safety indicators specify medical condi-
tions less than they do surgical problems. Consequently,
these safety indicators will be more problematic than other
quality measures among end users. Given the litigious
medical practice environment, such ambiguities are unhelp-
ful, if not unsafe.
What can be done?
Countries can and should strive towards evidence based
safety. The issues raised above will need to be addressed to
create re-prioritized, coherent, deeper, more focused, and
realistic safety initiatives with an encouraging medicolegal
environment. This re-prioritization should learn from estab-
lished approaches used in evidence based medicine and
rational decision making. Safety policies should invest more
in safety issues with the largest impact and conduct a better
search for more rigorous evidence of effectiveness.
By investing more, both financially and otherwise,
countries must critically:
N avoid useless and potentially harmful duplication of
initiatives or systems;
N clarify and unify concepts and definitions;
N expand and integrate the scope of safety within and
beyond the health system;
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N address the policies and societal environment which
hinder the inception of a culture of safety, fairness. and
openness with the wider society;
N redesign the training and working conditions of providers;
N engage patients and their families as partners in health;
and
N search for better data sets and coding system for safety
indicators as well as re-evaluate the preventability of
measured conditions.
CONCLUSIONS
Ensuring safety of health systems has led to the creation of
agencies, networks, and policies that may well become new
bureaucracies and regulatory mechanisms, and may discou-
rage learning and growth when they overburden profes-
sionals with new jargons, new protocols, and new
responsibilities. Providers, who must work with patients as
partners, are the key to any system redesign to confront
patient safety.20 74 ‘‘[I]gnoring the occasional need for innovation
can lead to robot-like execution of procedures in an unthinking,
unreflecting manner which is surely not in the best interest of the
patient.’’75
Furthermore, as other countries adopt these patient safety
models which become part of national accountability and
performance frameworks, it is imperative to explore their
transferability and to find out how such efforts actually affect
the safety culture, structures, practices, and outcomes.
Contextual analysis is indispensable for successful applica-
tion, acceptance, and appraisal of safety tools.76 It is not
enough to investigate whether these systems work; it is
imperative to find out how and why they reduce errors and
adverse events.19 77
We argue that, when it comes to routine surveillance or
performance measurement using indicators or both, perfor-
mers become what they measure or are expected to deliver.
How effective these initiatives become depends on how well
they are embedded in the medical culture, structures, and
policies which promote effective patient centred care. As
avoiding harm has been a fundamental tenet of medicine
since Hippocrates, we should remember to balance the
‘‘doing no harm’’ (safety) with ‘‘doing good’’ (effectiveness
or quality health care) at the level of both the individual
patient and the health system.
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